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| Design for the Union Station on Public Square, as of August, 1918. The Hotel Cleveland (right wing),already built, was to be a subordinate element in the overall design. Reproduced from Engineer's Report, 1919, CSU Archives. |
Continued from: "Enter the Van Sweringens"
Before 1918, Warren and Wetmore, the architects of Grand Central
Station in New York, had given architectural advice about the
station near Public Square. It seems likely that they were the
one who gave the Van Sweringens the idea for air rights development.
But in 1922 they were paid $12,000 in exchange for a release from
further obligation19:
the brothers, being politically astute, once they had decided
to build a union station, knew that the architectural contract
would have to go to Graham, Anderson, Probst and White, who not
only had designed the Cleveland Hotel next door, but as the successor
firm to D.H. Burnham, designer of the Group Plan Mall, were at
present commissioned to provide the design for the lake front
station.
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| Design for the Union Station on Public Square, as of August, 1918. The Hotel Cleveland (right wing),already built, was to be a subordinate element in the overall design. Reproduced from Engineer's Report, 1919, CSU Archives. |
The idea of changing the location of the station from the Mall
to Public Square engendered a heated debate in 1918 which was
to end with a public referendum on 6 January 1919. Some critics
said that the entire Mall project depended on the train station.
Out of this discussion came the suggestion of closing the Mall
loop with a monumental peristyle -- a colonnade. Obviously, the
Mall scheme could be reversed, with the peristyle serving as background
rather than functioning as gateway to the City of Cleveland. Furthermore,
the Mall location had been decided on by Johnson and reaffirmed
by his successor Newton Baker (Mayor 1911-15), now Secretary of
War in Woodrow Wilson's administration. How could this idea be
abandoned after so many years of nurturing? What was to become
of the Mall? Without the station, how would it emerge as the symbol
of the city?
Critics of the Public Square station pointed out that the topography
of the Square would require steep grades and curved platforms
for the trains, and they urged that the interests of the city
as a whole would be best served by avoiding the kind of concentration
that had occurred in downtown New York and Chicago. But the Union
Depot at Public Square had the advantage of providing a unified
transportation system. It would reinforce Public Square as the
center of the city, thus almost demanding high-density development
of the surroundings. Trains, interurbans, rapid transit, and streetcars
would be brought all together, and nine existing passengers stations
would be abandoned. The Van Sweringens saw these circumstances
as a reason for going ahead. They realize that there was little
land left for private development adjacent to the Mall area. Thus,
they argued there would be little opportunity to add to the tax
rolls, where as a new station would surely stimulate development
around it. (This argument -- developers still use today -- goes
back to Roman times.) Critics of the Van Sweringen scheme described
it as a ruse to further their own real estate interests. There
was obviously some truth in this charge.
Long before the public debate about the proposed site took place,
preliminary architectural and engineering studies for a union
station at Public Square had begun, in May, 1918. After a meeting
in New York with Ernest Graham, the architect, W.E. Pease of the
Terminals Company went to Chicago to discuss the project with
Graham's partner, Pierce Anderson. 20
From all the available evidence, it seems that Graham secured
the commission for his firm, while Anderson was the actual partner
in charge of the work. A few days later, on May 28, 1918, representatives
of the railroads met with Van Sweringen. Anderson presented plans
for the terminal. The railroad men, who were far from committed
to the project, were shocked at the Van Sweringens' precipitousness,
and demanded that the architect prepare no more plans until certain
studies had been completed. At this time, as the needs of the
future users of the terminal had not yet been determined, the
design was being drawn from the outside in!
In the summer of 1918 an Engineering Committee consisting of representatives
from the railroads began studies of population growth, ticket
sales, numbers of trains, etc. (what is now called a market analysis).
21
They ultimately decided on a station capacity that would suffice
for 25 years, and insisted that their needs for storage yards,
coach storage, engine repair shops and the like be taken into
account. One of the key questions, the city's attitude toward
steam operations so close to the center of the city, was eventually
answered when the city insisted on electrification between East
37th Street and West 30th Street to avoid the emission of large
amounts of smoke and soot in the downtown area.
On August 13, the Committee issued a preliminary report calling
for a double-deck station with a concourse in between, located
at or near Public Square. The lower deck was to be planned and
leased as a separate facility and terminal for electric, interurban
and local rapid transit service. For steam trains there were to
be 15 tracks with a provision for expansion to 24. Warehouses
were to built over the passenger tracks from Broadway to Eagle
to East 23rd Street. The cost for these would borne by the Van
Sweringens' Terminal Company. Cost for the total project including
the right of way was estimated at more than $41 million.
After this tentative Engineering Report, the Cleveland Union Terminals
Company was incorporated to oversee the design, construction and
management of the station by the Van Sweringen interests; 22
during 1918, however, it was a dormant corporation: it conducted
no operations and had no income. The entire stock of this company
was eventually transferred to the railroads, but even the O.P.
Van Sweringen was authorized to vote the stock for the election
of directors until completion of the depot. The Van Sweringens
were in control of the project. The railroads needed them to negotiate
a favorable deal with the City.
On 23 October, 1918, the city council passed enabling ordinances
which led to the battle over the proposed site for the station.
23
Although O.P. Van Sweringen was a member of the City Planning
Commission at the time, he was not allowed to vote on the terminal
project. On 29 October, 1918, Mr. Smith of the U.S.R.A. wrote
to the Mayor of Cleveland saying it was now necessary that the
ordinance be approved by popular vote for the matter to proceed
further with the Railroad Administration and railroad corporations
involved. To the railroads he wrote this reassuring note: "It
is not the intention to do any extensive construction under present
war prices. It is estimated by the time the preliminary steps
are taken a readjustment of prices will likely have taken place."
24
But the City wanted and took steps to have the project completed
quickly. Prices did not fall and the railroad executives continued
to be concerned about increased costs: by 1921 the estimated cost
had risen to over $54 million, and by November, 1925, to over
$106 million.
The Engineering Committee, on 6 December, 1918, reported that a passenger station approached directly from Public Square was feasible and practicable. 25 After many months of negotiations with the City and debates in Council, a public referendum, on the question of the site was held, on 6 January, 1919. The Public Square site for the Union Station was approved by the citizens of Cleveland. No doubt civic pride played an important role in this vote. Everybody could see that Cleveland's present passenger facilities were inadequate. At the time, this action must have pleased the lake front railroads, for they thought they were going to save the large expenditure for the monumental construction contemplated for the Mall site because the Van Sweringens were to develop the air rights over the station. The Cleveland Terminals Company expended over $25,000 for advertising and printing costs to influence a favorable vote. 26
Continues in: "Further delays"