Continued from: "Fitting the station into the city"
The more the plan for a double-deck station was studied and its
technical implications understood, the less feasible it seemed.
34
In 1920, for both technical and economic reasons, plans were adopted
for a single-deck station with tracks at elevation 52. This important
decision was to influence all others.
It is in this period that the detailed needs for the station were
finally determined and recommendations made. These were based
on the original requirements for the station on the Mall, compared
to those of Grand Central Station in New York City, as modified
by H.D. Jouett, Terminal Engineer for Grand Central Station at
the time. During this formative period, W.E. Pease was Chief Engineer
of the Cleveland Union Terminals Company. Jouett officially began
to oversee the Terminal project on 1 January, 1922. 35
He made detailed critical comments on a series of proposed plans
developed by the architects, especially with regard to how the
various functions should relate to each other, to the spaces needed
for them, and to the working conditions within each space. In
other words, he worked out the architectural program.
By the end of 1920 a general plan and conception based on programmatic
needs for the station had been developed. 36
Now came the job of the Railroad Committee: to refine and implement
this plan. In June, 1922 it suggested a new track plan calling
for 12 station tracks with growth to 24. This decision called
for the rearrangement of certain proposed streets -- the streets
in the terminal complex were carried on bridges so the trains
and station could be subgrade -- and the purchase of and additional
15-foot frontage along lower Superior Avenue. Van Sweringen summarized
the land question and the political situations as to the required
street changes: additional frontage on Superior...estimated cost
of $2,533,500...80 feet depth will remain...as salvage...Suitable
development of this...[should] realize substantially the cost
of all property involved. On the street his usual political craftiness,
"It is not improbable that the city will approve...but the
request should be not made...until construction work has progressed
to a point where the public are thoroughly convinced of the work
going ahead and at a time when the complete exhibit of accurate
plans can be submitted to them without revealing information that
does not now want to be discussed." 37
Besides increasing track capacity, the advantage of this extension
to the railroads was longer platforms and easier curves for the
tracks. Van Sweringen hoped to enlarge the commercial district,
perhaps with a theater or other intensive development. He put
pressure on the Railroad Committee to agree to this extension
by saying that the Building Company had options on some of the
needed property that were shortly to expire. Thus, the cost could
be considerably higher in the future. Ultimately, the Railroad
Committee agreed.
By December, 1923 the Railroad Committee reached decisions to
govern the architects and engineers in preparing new plans, which
were approved on 15 January, 1924. These specifications included
the width of the ticket lobby (93 feet), the type and location
of ticket counter, 38
the location of the cab stand, station master's office barber
shop etc. The guiding principle behind these new arrangements
was nicely to balance the respective importance of the facilities
considering both service and revenue. By the end of January, 1924
twenty different schemes, prepared by the architects, had already
been considered. In April, 1924, because of the death of architect
Pierce Anderson, C.F. Kruse was assigned to represent the architects
on the various design subcommittees.
In May, 1924 it was decided -- "for obvious reasons" -- not to fight the city in the courts against the requested price, almost $900,000 higher than the estimated value, for the Police and Fire Department facilities to be demolished to make way for the Terminal. Negotiations were carried out by O.P. Van Sweringen himself. They knew whom not to offend, especially since the heightening of the tower had already been decided but had yet to be announced. The Terminals Company overpaid for other properties, too. For example, as L.C. James, General Land and Tax Agent for the New York Central, reported to the Railroad Committee:" It seems inconceivable that the foreign-speaking people residing in the vicinity of the west approach pay the rentals prevalent in this territory or purchase homes at the current market prices recorded in this district, but investigation indicates that their first consideration is to obtain a home near their local parochial school and church in the vicinity where their fellow countrymen live. The wretched hovels...are not worth the capitalized rent value of many of these buildings." In dealing with land and lease holders who the Terminal Company believed demanded excessive prices, even after independent appraisal, for their property, they would normally go to court. There were over one hundred such cases. O.P. Van Sweringen determined part of this strategy the Company was to follow at the appropriation proceedings: have as few lawyers present as possible, as a mob of lawyers would "only result in putting in the minds of the jurors the we have money to burn."
Continues in: "A monumental secret"